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Facebook Versus Ghaddafi:
Social Networking as a
Tool for Democratic
Change in Libya
Ezieddin Elmahjub1
The reason behind the backwardness of Middle Eastern
countries lies in political despotism, and the cure of such
backwardness lies in constitutional democracy.2
Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi
Tabai al-Istibdad wa-Masari al-Isti’bad
[The Nature of Despotism] 1849
The emergence of the Internet is one of the most signifi-
cant leaps in the history of humanity. Information, knowledge
and culture are exchanged among masses of people through
interconnected information platforms. These platforms enable
our culture to be analysed and rewritten, and fundamentally
opens our perceptions to a wide variety of concepts and
beliefs. The connected networks of the Internet have shaped a
virtual — but communicative — space where people can
cross borders freely within a realm characterised by the ability
to go anywhere, see anything, learn, compare and understand. 
Fundamental within that realm are social networking
platforms that facilitate the building of social relations among
people who, for example, share interests, activities and
backgrounds.3 These platforms enable information to be dissem-
inated to an unlimited audience, and facilitate interactive
Elmahjub.x_Elmahjub.x  1/02/13  9:31 AM  Page 1
FACEBOOK VERSUS GHADDAFI
2SPACE PLACE & CULTURE
dialogue on issues of common interest. Hundreds of millions
of people around the world use these platforms for a variety of
purposes, such as getting updates on friends and relatives,
tracking the latest on their favourite celebrity, or making new
social connections. 
The capability to disseminate information and reach a large
audience has the potential to affect public opinion and thus
influence directions within society. In Manufacturing Consent: The
Political Economy of the Mass Media (1988), Edward S. Herman
and Noam Chomsky recognised such capability of conventional
media in favour of ‘the powerful societal interests that control
and finance [it]’.4 What is unique about social networking
platforms — as a form of ‘social media’ — is that it is not neces-
sary to be a powerful stakeholder in society to be able to dissem-
inate information, influence public opinion and affect society’s
directions. Even individuals have the potential to do so. This is
exactly what took place in the Middle East and North African
(MENA) region in late 2010 and the beginning of 2011. 
During this time, the youth of the MENA countries, stand-
ing up for a common cause — to break the shackles of tyranny
and oppression — used modern communications technology as
a tool for democratic change and thereby earned their freedom
and dignity. The overwhelming majority of them were poor and
uninfluential, but they had the opportunity to make change, and
they did so through Facebook, Twitter and YouTube.5
This chapter focuses on the Libyan experience with social
networking platforms in actualising democratic change in the
uprising of 17 February 2011. After briefly outlining the polit-
ical and economic situation under the regime of Colonel
Mummar Ghaddafi, the chapter discusses the role that social
networking platforms played during the struggle of the Libyan
people for  democratic change. Finally, it points out the
positive changes that resulted from the uprising and the poten-
tial role that social media might play in the ongoing democra-
tisation and development of Libyan society.
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Revolutionary situations
In 1969, Colonel Mummar Ghaddafi6 led a group of officers in a
military coup d’état against the government of King Idris
Alsanusi, who had been in power since Libya’s independence on
24 December 1951. Ghaddafi declared Libya as a Socialist
Republic and promised an era of prosperity, freedom and
justice.7 However, by the last quarter of 1970, Ghaddafi had
already started to isolate his partners in that coup, either through
imprisonment or political assassination.8 In 1976 he established a
radically unique idea, set out in his manifesto — The Green Book
— which was based on Athenian Democracy, Marxist ideology
and Ghaddafi’s own interpretations of Islam.9 According to The
Green Book, people would have the right to engage in political
and economic affairs through direct democracy by means of
general public conferences spread across all Libyan cities. The
ideas in Ghaddafi’s Green Book provided the theoretical frame-
work for Libya’s highest constitutional document, the so-called
‘Declaration of People’s Authority’, adopted in 1977. However,
direct democracy existed only in theory. 
Martin Asser, wr iting for the BBC, descr ibed how
Ghaddafi used the Green Book:
[A] text whose professed objective is to break the
shackles imposed by the vested interests dominating
political systems was used instead to subjugate an
entire population.10
In reality, Ghaddfi directly opposed parliamentary democracy
and described it as ‘misrepresentation of the people’.11 Political
parties were banned12 and those who broke the law were
threatened with execution. It was common in the 1980s for
Libyan television to broadcast trials and public hangings of
Libyan citizens who were accused of opposing Ghaddafi.
Despite Libya possessing the seventh largest oil reserves in the
world, its infrastructure was highly deficient and some 20 per
cent of Libyans were unemployed,13 mostly as a result of
corruption among the political elite of the country. 
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During his 41 years in power, Colonel Ghaddafi managed
to skilfully rule the country with an iron fist. His regime caused
an erosion of the national identity of the Libyan people by
organising state institutions along tribal lines and appointing
members of Ghaddafi’s own tribe to leading positions in the
armed forces and high-ranking government offices.
Fundamental human rights and basic freedoms, such as free
speech, freedom of religion, private property,14 and privacy were
undermined.15 Students who spoke openly in the universities
were subject to arbitrary arrest and imprisonment. There was no
official recognition of a right to assembly. It was common
among Libyans to warn each other about speaking of Ghaddfi
in a critical manner in public, and there were few civil society
organisations. According to Freedom House, Libya ranked
among the worst in the world in terms of basic human rights
and freedoms. On a scale of 0 to 7 (with 0 representing weakest
and 7 representing strongest performance), Libya ranked 1.17 in
civil liberties; 0.56 in accountability and public voice; 1.12 in
rule of law and 0.19 in anticorruption and transparency.16
The media was controlled by the state and was concerned
mainly with broadcasting news or songs glorifying Ghaddafi
and overstating his achievements. Azmi Bishara, the General
Director of the Arab Centre for Research and Policy Studies,
accurately describes Ghaddafi and Libya under his regime:
Ghaddafi considered himself as suprahuman condition
above the concept of state. That is why he remained in
pre-state condition. Under the role of Ghaddafi, there
existed no state in Libya. He governed Libya with pure
tribal mechanisms and considered himself above the
concept of morality and that is why he practically
lived without morals.17
Necessity for change
Public dissatisfaction with the attitude and performance of
Colonel Ghaddafi was apparent from as early as April 1976,
when student protests occurred in Benghazi and Tripoli.18 The
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regime responded by persecuting and executing the protesters.
Until well into the 1980s, the Ghaddafi regime designated 7
April as the national day for the elimination of opposition
leaders. Another sign of dissatisfaction was the attack on
Ghaddafi’s headquarters in Tripoli in 1984 by a group of Libyans
from different cities. All were killed.
However, with the advent of satellites, Libyans started to
have an eye on the outside world. They began to compare
their situation in terms of human rights and freedom with
other nations. It was common during the 1990s and early
2000s for Libyans to cynically criticise — in closed social
circles — their living standards in terms of health, education,
public facilities, and income.  
The spread of the internet among the youth in early
2000s added more fuel to the already tense situation. The
advent of platforms such as Facebook and YouTube, which do
not recognise cultural and linguistic barriers, provided Libyans
with a constantly open pathway to the outside world, and all
attempts by the government to minimise the impact of social
media were unsuccessful.
The desire for change was present in the Libyan people
from the beginning of the Ghaddafi regime, but the strength of
Ghaddafi’s security services prevented change from occurring.
Those who had believed in change realised that any attempt to
make it a reality would be violently crushed. Accordingly,
without efficient tools for organising and delivering the message
to the outside world, change from within remained a dream.
This situation continued from the 1980s until the 2000s. At the
same time, having seen the negative consequences of the
American intervention in Iraq in 2003, for the overwhelming
majority of Libyans foreign intervention on the ground to
change the Ghaddafi regime was out of the question.  
Libyan youth hold, with the rest of the world, a set of
what can be called universal values19 that do not recognise
cultural differences, religious backgrounds, space or place:
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freedom, dignity, independence, justice, equality and democ-
racy. With their eyes on the rest of the world, through the
Internet and social networking platforms, Libyan youth
increasingly came to understand that these values were not
shared by the Ghaddafi regime. Ghaddafi’s sons and closed
circles of tribal leaders and loyal individuals oppressed people
and humiliated them: property could be seized without a
proper cause, the judiciary system was highly influenced by
Ghaddafi’s men, and the state’s institutions were in the hands
of incompetent and corrupt individuals. With all this, Ghaddafi
was publicly planning to appoint his son Saif al-Islam Gaddafi
as his successor. He appointed his son, Mutassim, as head of the
office of national security, and another son, Khamis, to the
leadership of the elite brigades of the Libyan Army.20
The time has come
On 18 December 2010, Tunisians took to the streets in huge
rallies and demonstrations to demand an end to the regime of
President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, who had held power for 24
years. Ben Ali officially resigned on 15 January 2011. Ten days
later on 25 January 2011, millions of Egyptians marched in the
streets and gathered in the famous Tahrir Square (Liberation
Square) in Cairo to demand an end to the regime of President
Hosni Mubarak, who had held power for 30 years. On 11
February 2011, President Mubarak left office. Libyans observed
their neighbours, the Tunisians and the Egyptians, with a keen
eye. Facebook pages of the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions
witnessed compassionate interactions from Libyan fans. Libyan
youth were following through YouTube what was happening
in the streets of Tunisian and Egyptian cities during the upris-
ings. Comments in support of both revolutions were common
and practised daily by Libyan fans.
For many years Libyans had lived under an authoritarian
regime that shared many of the characteristics of the Tunisian
and Egyptian regimes in terms of oppression and the ruthlessness
Elmahjub.x_Elmahjub.x  1/02/13  9:31 AM  Page 6
EZIEDDIN ELMAHJUB
7 SPACE PLACE & CULTURE
of the security arms. The Libyans might even have extra
reasons such as the fact that Ghaddafi had held power for 41
years, and that in terms of natural resources Libya is richer
than Egypt and Tunisia, although this was not reflected on the
living standards of Libyans.  
Creating the revolution 
Through witnessing and interacting with developments in
Egypt and Tunisia, Libyans decided to start their own struggle
towards democratic change. In late January 2011, a page
appeared on Facebook under the name ‘The Uprising of the
17th of February, a Day for Rage in Libya’.21 This Facebook
page called upon Libyans to learn from the Tunisian and
Egyptian experiences. It pointed to calamities and tragedies
that had occurred during Ghaddafi’s rule, such as the killing of
1,269 political prisoners in four hours in the notorious
Abusalim prison in Tripoli in 1996.22 It also posted photos of
Ghaddafi’s sons spending money in fancy hotels and yachts in
Europe as a sign of corruption of the regime. The page admin-
istrators appointed 17th February 2011 as a day for protests
around Libya.23
On 15 February 2011, some young Libyans responded to
the Facebook invitation and took to the streets in the city of
Albyeda, 1,200 kilometres east of Tr ipoli. In response,
Ghaddafi’s security forces killed two of them and arrested
several others. 
Sensing the potential danger of the social networking
platforms, Colonel Ghaddafi called famous Libyan Internet
activists and bloggers for a meeting in Tripoli at the beginning
of February 2011, warning them that they would be held
accountable if they contributed to actions against the state.
However, Ghaddafi’s warning came too late. Within a short
timespan, the Uprising of the 17th of February Facebook page
had attracted 82,000 followers.24 By 17 February 2011, tens of
thousands of Libyans took to the streets of Benghazi, Libya’s
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second largest city, to demand the change of the Ghaddafi
regime. The following days witnessed bloody clashes in the
city between the demonstrators and the security forces, result-
ing in the killing of hundreds of civilian protestors.25
Meanwhile, videos and pictures — mostly taken by mobile
phones — of the demonstrations and the security armed
response were constantly being posted on YouTube and
Facebook, and rebroadcasted by the media. As a result,
unprecedented international coverage of the situation in Libya
took place, associated with condemnation from the interna-
tional community for the brutality of Ghaddafi’s regime.26 On
21 February 2011, Ghaddafi’s security forces were driven out
of the entire eastern coast of Libya.
On 19 February, in the city of Misrata, Libya’s industrial
capital and the third largest city, some 50,000 citizens took to
the streets, and by the 22nd it was liberated from Ghaddfi
brigades. Meanwhile, on 21 February, the demonstrations
moved to the stronghold of Ghaddafi, the nation’s capital,
Tripoli. At that stage, Ghaddafi and his supporters decided to
unleash their maximum military force.
What is unique in that phase of the Libyan revolution is
the instant flow and dissemination of information. Young
Internet users acted as journalists and reporters for the events
on the ground. Stories, funerals, footage of injured persons, and
waves of human masses chanting freedom slogans were
constantly posted on social platforms right after the specific
event would unfold. These stories would have remained
unheard without the power of social networking platforms.
Ghaddafi cracked down on the demonstrations in Tripoli,
and it is estimated that the loss of human life was 600 on the
first day alone. In addition, on 3 March 2011, the Ghaddafi
regime blocked Internet networks in Tripoli and other cities in
the western part of Libya.27 He called on the Libyan people —
via Libya’s state media — to post videos on the Internet
showing support for Colonel Ghaddafi! 
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The pictures and videos posted online from Libya were
horrifying as Ghaddafi started to use heavy weaponry such as
tanks and multi-rocket launchers to regain control of cities
from the demonstrators. The United Nations (UN) Security
Council issued a decision to impose a no-fly zone28 as a result
of Ghaddafi’s use of the airforce. At the same time, demonstra-
tors turned to freedom fighters in order to defend themselves
against the assaults of Ghaddafi’s forces.
Social networking channels — mainly YouTube and
Facebook — played a very important role in delivering the
news to the outside world after Ghaddafi’s siege of Misrata.
This city was of particular importance to Ghaddafi as it was
200 km from his stronghold of Tripoli. As a result, Ghaddafi
sent some 12,000 soldiers to take over Misrata. Those soldiers
laid siege to the city and started to bombard its neighbour-
hoods with rockets and live ammunition. Youth from the city
had used digital cameras and mobile phones to record the
resulting destruction and the plight of the residents, uploading
these images through concealed Internet-satellite facilities.
Some young Libyans also managed to provide daily audio
reports on the events that took place in the city during the
siege and uploaded them to YouTube.29
The movement of conventional media was highly
restricted, especially in the cities controlled by Ghaddafi.
Therefore, Internet activists who were not dependent on
government networks uploaded to YouTube and Facebook
footages of queues for food and fuel in Tripoli, which lacked
essential supplies as a result of the international embargo
imposed by the UN.
Ghaddafi’s response to the civil movement of the Libyan
youth in February 2011 transformed it to an armed rebellion.
This led to the overthrow of the Ghaddafi regime on 21
August 2011 when rebels overtook Tr ipoli and caused
Ghaddafi to flee to his hometown, Sirt, where he was killed in
street fighting with the rebels on 20 October 2011.
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Ghaddafi’s death marked the end of one of the longest
dictatorships in the history of mankind; ironically, the first
reports of his death to the world and instant pictures of it were
posted on Facebook. 
A tool of connection and change
As alluded to in the previous pages, the desire for change
existed from the early days of Ghaddafi’s rule as he revealed his
authoritarian approach to governance. This desire united
Libyans from different ideological and ethnic backgrounds
behind a common cause — toppling the Ghaddafi regime and
forming a democratic pluralist system. However, this desire
remained dormant because of the brutality and the watchful
eye of Ghaddafi’s security and intelligence services.
The masses, which had long desired change in Libya,
needed a tool for connection. Such a tool had to have certain
features. It had to be inherently anti-authoritarian and with
the ability to circumvent the intelligence agencies’ monitoring
eye. It had to provide a platform that connected people so they
could safely coordinate, organise and share plans for change
instead of the conventional way of coordinating and organis-
ing revolutions through secret meetings.  
The tool required for connection was found in social
networking platforms, mainly Facebook and YouTube. The
announcement on Facebook to consider 17 February 2011 as
a day of rage against the Ghaddafi regime was the catalyst of
the Libyan revolution towards democratic change. Those who
had long desired change needed a tool to connect them to set
the date for action. Without Facebook’s ability to spread the
word across distances and borders, such a desire would have
remained an unheard narrative. Accordingly, the blocking of
the Internet by the Ghaddafi regime and restricting access to
Facebook in the cities controlled by his regime did not change
the fact that the revolution had already begun, and its flames
were soon to reach his long-preserved seat of power.
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Even after the Internet was blocked, social networking
platforms continued to play an essential role in the Libyan
revolution. For instance, Internet activists in Tripoli who had
satellite-Internet access used Facebook and YouTube to
disseminate information and footages to the outside world
showing the wrongdoing of the Ghaddafi regime. The distri-
bution of these images worldwide added to the international
pressure on the regime and eroded its pillars. 
Some commentators on the Arab spring in general refer
to the social networking platforms as mere facilitators for the
historical and radical changes that took place in Tunisia, Egypt
and Libya.30 It is true that these tools do not have the ability to
actualise change by themselves; however, at the same time,
change would not have taken place without them. It was the
social networking platforms such as Facebook, Twitter and
YouTube that sparked the flames of change, made them grow
and led to the desired end, which was to make the dreams of
democracy, dignity and freedom come true. They were the
thread which had been sought for so long, to connect people
so they could share their thoughts and aspirations for a better
future. They were also the mechanism required to disseminate
effective plans to as many people as possible. For those who
question the vital role of the social media platforms, it is suffi-
cient to ask one question: Why did it take the people so long
to rise up against tyranny and humiliation? And how did
people miraculously rise up immediately after the flourishing
of social media?
Manifestations of democracy in post-revolution
Libya
The leadership of the Libyan revolution embodied in the
National Transitional Council (NTC)31 committed itself
through the Constitutional Declaration adapted on the 3 August
2011 — two months before the official collapse of Ghaddafi
regime — to building a democratic, multi-party state based on
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respect for fundamental human rights32 and freedom.33 It also
recognised the right to assembly and free speech as well as the
importance of free media.34
The practical results of the Libyan revolution include:
1.  For the first time in five decades, Libyans participated in
free elections to elect 200 men and women for the
National Conference, the body responsible for forming a
government and preparing a permanent constitution for
the country.35 According to the High National Election
Committee, 2.7 million Libyans — out of 3 million eligi-
ble Libyan voters — registered to elect 200 representatives
from the 2,639 candidates.36 In the first national elections
held in July 2012, 1.7 million people cast a vote.37 Among
the representatives elected were 32 women, accounting
for 17% of the total seats.38
2.  From being a country with a state-controlled media in
which government would censor what goes public,39
Libya is experiencing a surge in the freedom of press, only
a year after the revolution started. ‘Hundreds of newspa-
pers, countless websites, television and radio stations have
sprung up from nothing.’40 The BBC reported that
‘journalists are experiencing unprecedented free condi-
tions of working, with no clear red lines for reporting.’41
One of the unique phenomena brought by democratic
change in Libya is that even the television station founded
by the new government42 can criticise the performance of
the government and host opposition leaders on weekly
political shows.
3.  Another aspect of democratic change in Libya is the
mushrooming of civil society organisations. Libya used to
have highly restrictive legislation for civil society.43 The
process for registering a civil society organisation could
take up to two years and there was no guarantee that
registration would be granted.44 In less than one year after
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the revolution, some 861 organisations have been regis-
tered in Tripoli and Benghazi alone.45
Nonetheless, the democratisation of Libya is by no means a
completed task. Those who started up as ‘Facebook revolu-
tionaries’ had to carry weapons to defend themselves at some
point during the revolution. After the Ghaddafi regime
collapsed, they still carry their weapons and represent one of
the most acute obstacles for the democratisation of Libya. At
this point in time, they are weakening the government’s
authority and degrading the achievements of the revolution as
they attract the criticism of human rights organisations for
human rights abuses against the supporters of the deposed
regime.46 However, such an obstacle is by no means insur-
mountable because the government has introduced programs
to integrate the rebels into the Ministries of Defence and the
Interior and to provide external training for them.
Future prospects 
After the revolution, and during the process of state formation
which is now taking place in Libya, social networking
platforms are expected to play an essential role in the process
of democratisation of the country.
The NTC and several Libyan Ministries have official
pages on Facebook which they use to post decisions, declara-
tions and responses to issues of public concern. High-ranking
Libyan officials also have personal pages on Facebook and
Twitter, which enable them to interact with citizens on public
policy issues. The adaptation of the social networking
platforms by government ministries and agencies in Libya is
expected to grow substantially. The interactive nature of these
platforms will allow wider public engagement in the process
of policy-making, as well as in enhancing the transparency
and accountability of public sector institutions47 — including
the government and its different branches. The flourishing of
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civil society organisations that Libya is witnessing now will
make such engagement even more efficient. 
Ways in which social media is expected to enhance
democracy in post-revolution Libya include:
•   Improving government performance: Social networking
platforms allow citizens to report to government bodies
on the efficiency of any of the governmental programs,
which would allow these bodies to respond and adapt
such programs to the reality and needs of the society in a
prompt and effective manner. Additionally, the public
reporting function of these platforms will enhance the
accountability of the government officials as they will feel
that they are closely monitored by citizens.
•   Enhancing transparency in the allocation of financial resources:
Government bodies, for instance, could easily post on social
media platforms their budgets and the expenditures of
officials to allow people to be informed, as well as to express
their opinions. The possibility of creating interactive dialogue
within social networking platforms, between governmental
bodies and citizens, could make the allocation of the state
budget more responsive to the priorities of Libyan citizens.
Despite the richness in natural resources which Libya enjoys,
the country suffers from a severe lack of development. The
deficiencies in public facilities in terms of roads, hospitals,
schools, public parks and so on are readily apparent on the
streets of the national capital, Tripoli, and even more so in other
Libyan cities. The main cause of these woes is the authoritari-
anism of the previous regime, in which corruption and the
suppression of political rights were the dominant features that
characterised its operation over a period of 41 years. The
process of development requires a creative population, the
existence of which is dependent on the availability of freedom,
justice and democracy. These three pillars explain, in most cases,
why certain nations are more developed than others. 
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Amartya Sen, winner of the Nobel Prize in Economic
Sciences in 1998, asserts that democracy ‘is an essential
component of the process of development’48; it gives
the people the opportunity to draw attention force-
fully to general needs, and demand appropriate public
action. Governmental response to acute suffering of
people often depends on the pressure that is put on
the government, and this is where the exercise of
political rights (voting, criticising ..., and protesting ...)
can make a real difference.49
Social networking platforms provide a very effective venue for
such democratic engagement to take place. Accordingly, these
platforms can play a role in promoting development.  
Conclusion
The MENA region has for decades been a hotspot charac-
terised by war, instability and dictatorship. Modern technology
embodied in social networking platforms has contributed to
news of a different kind from that troubled area — news of
people who share values with the rest of humanity, and aspire
to build democratic and developed societies in which human
rights and freedom are respected. By 2015, the number of
Internet users in the MENA region is expected to exceed 100
million.50 As a result, the share of social networking platforms
is expected to increase. Accordingly, even after the collapse of
the dictatorships, Facebook, Twitter and YouTube and other
social networking platforms will continue to play an important
role in exercising the political rights brought about by the
recent changes in the region and in enhancing government
transparency and accountability.
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